

THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS  
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ER 2523X 88

ER 2582X 88

ER 3296X 88

ER 3207X 88

ER 3385X 88

ER 3384X 88

SUBJECT: HFAC Hrg on SEO

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ER 3384X-88

29 August 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:   
Director, Security Evaluation Office


25X1

SUBJECT: Draft Testimony before the House Foreign  
Affairs Committee

Attached is a revised version of the draft House Foreign Affairs  
Committee testimony. As you can see, I have incorporated all of the DDCI's  
recommended changes. I have sent a copy of this revised package to Bob Lamb,  
and Ron Spiers asking them for comments and suggestions. Please let me know  
if you have any further emendations.

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Attachment:  
As stated



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*L-268-1R*

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Draft Testimony before the House Foreign  
Affairs Committee

Distribution:

Orig - DCI

Orig - DDCI

1 - ER (w/o/att)

1 - SEO Chron

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D/SEO/DCI  (29 Aug 88)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## **Shultz and Webster to the President**

### **3 August 1987**

"...We propose the establishment of a unit which would set the standards for protecting Embassies from penetration by foreign intelligence activity and monitor conformity with those standards...

"...head of this unit would be named by and responsible to the DCI...

"...staff would be drawn from the various agencies involved in our diplomatic and intelligence functions abroad..."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## **Powell to Shultz and Webster 22 October 1987**

"...President concurs...security programs at our overseas missions remain the responsibility of the Secretary of State..."

"...President agrees with your recommendation...a unit responsible for setting standards to protect embassies from penetration by foreign intelligence activity, and for monitoring conformity..."

"...head of this unit will...be responsible to the DCI..."

"...this unit should be independent of the organization of the Director of Diplomatic Security..."

"...working level advisory group...Additionally...a high-level board...Board will have the authority to recommend...In the event of disagreement...an appeal can be made to the President."

"...DCI report annually to the President and the Congress..."

"The President is determined..."

clear lines of responsibility for security be established...

within State a fully effective security organization be established...

aggressive, objective audits...be institutionalized...

sanctions process be formalized..."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## DCI Security Evaluation Office

Director	Appointed by DCI	
Deputy Director	Nominated by State, Appointed by DCI	
Size		reimbursable detail
Source	Wherever skills are available to match SEO needs	
Modalities	Volunteers preferred, draft if necessary	

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


### **This office will:**

- Analyze the vulnerabilities of our foreign missions and the hostile intelligence threat to them
- Set security standards to protect our missions against foreign intelligence activity
- Monitor conformance with those standards, and
- Report problems and recommendations to the DCI

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## Concept for Organization



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
## Criteria for Operations

- Encourage improvements, force them only as last resort
- Support Bureau of Diplomatic Security, don't undercut it
- Be invisible to Foreign Service
- Be constantly on the mind of State management
- D/SEO will have "no surprise" policy with Assistant Secretary, Diplomatic Security
- SEO detailees will meet DCI personnel security standards
- SEO will operate on internal "need-to-know" basis
- D/SEO will have bilateral arrangements with FBI, NSA, State, CIA, and DoD
- Maximum use of NSA, State, CIA, and DoD data and inspections

LCAS01BW.001 STAFF 3/2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## Functional Relationships



CONFIDENTIAL

Provided to Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Diplomatic Security  
as an attachment to a 25 May 1988 memorandum from the Director, Security  
Evaluation Office with the following request:

In anticipation of future visits to posts, a draft cable is attached  
describing the Security Evaluation Office. My suggestion is that this  
be sent out as a general information item now with the intention of  
providing detail prior to specific visits.

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~~SECRET~~  
The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington D C 20505

18 July 1988

The Honorable Chester Atkins  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Atkins:

This is in reply to your statement and questions submitted for the record on 16 June 1988. Your question (see enclosure) referred to a 14 June briefing to the HFAC Staff by the Director of the DCI Security Evaluation Office, [redacted], and Mr. Robert Lamb, Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security. Their meeting actually took place on Monday, 13 June from 1030 to 1230 hours. [redacted]

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First, let us review what the DCI Security Evaluation Office is in broad terms and then address your specific comments and questions. [redacted]

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We should begin the overview by restating that the Secretary of State is the official responsible for the management of embassies and missions abroad. This point was incorporated in the President's directive to Secretary Shultz and the DCI in connection with the establishment of the DCI Security Evaluation Office. [redacted]

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The DCI Security Evaluation Office is to perform an independent audit function, established under the DCI by direction of the President and with the support of the Secretary of State to formulate security standards to protect U.S. diplomatic establishments from intelligence activity and to monitor compliance with those standards. The Secretary of State manages and directs the Department of State and is responsible for security in his diplomatic and consular posts abroad. It is his management prerogative to accept the standards we set and his decision whether to comply with those standards. It is the DCI's responsibility to work with the Secretary to achieve improvements in security abroad. The President directed the DCI to report to him and the Congress concerning these standards and compliance issues. [redacted]

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Now to the specific questions and comments raised in your question for the record.

- The DCI Security Evaluation Office was established 4 April 1988. Our objective is to have an initial operating capability of 20-30 people by 1 October 1988 and to complete staffing by April 1989. In the meantime, since April 1988, the accruing staff is involved in various start-up activities.
- The recruitment of people and the start-up date of the Security Evaluation could not have been a surprise to Assistant Secretary Lamb as you mentioned in your statement for the record. You must have been misinformed on that point. The Director of the Security Evaluation Office discussed recruitment with Mr. Lamb and/or his deputy on 16 March, 4 April, and 3 May. Dates for personnel nominations and milestones for initial operating capabilities were discussed with the entire State Management Council, chaired by Under Secretary Spiers, and attended by Mr. Lamb, on 20 May. A 25 May memorandum from the Security Evaluation Office to Mr. Lamb spelled out in detail the nomination of people by State, NSA, DoD, and CIA. The memorandum also described the October milestone and the goal for full staff by April 1989. Mr. Lamb's responding memorandum of 27 May to the Director of the Security Evaluation Office asked for a description of the duties to be performed by subelements of the office and stated his willingness to offer Diplomatic Security Officers for detail. Those duty descriptions were provided to Mr. Lamb as an attachment to a 3 June memorandum from the Security Evaluation Office. In summary of this point, it appears that someone misinformed you and I hope this detailed explanation lays the matter to rest.

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- The Secretary of State is responsible for embassy security.
- The establishment of the DCI Security Evaluation Office was based upon a request that Secretary Shultz and I made to the President in August 1987. We proposed "... The head of this unit would be named by and responsible to the DCI, who will report problems and recommendations to the Secretary of State for his action as the person responsible for the management of embassies and missions abroad . . . ." [redacted]

25X1

Colin Powell replied 22 October 1987 "... The President agrees with your recommendation to establish a unit responsible for setting standards to protect embassies from penetration by foreign intelligence activity, and for monitoring conformity with those standards. The head of the unit will be named by and be responsible to the DCI, who will report problems and recommendations to the Secretary of State for his action as the official responsible for the management of embassies and missions abroad . . . ." [redacted]

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


S E C R E T

As a final observation, may I share a perception as to the appropriateness of the Secretary of State asking the Director of Central Intelligence for assistance in protecting his embassies from foreign intelligence threats. The DCI is responsible for foreign counterintelligence and it is a foreign counterintelligence problem facing our embassies and other State Department establishments. Also, the DCI is responsible for the National Foreign Intelligence Program and has various directive and coordinating authorities that he can bring to bear in assisting the Secretary of State. All of this appears to be consistent with the provisions of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 (PL 99-399), especially Section 106, as well as other laws and executive orders.

25X1

Sincerely yours,



William H. Webster

Enclosure

June 16, 1986

Hearing on H.R. 3822, the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1986

Statement and question submitted for the record by Hon. Chester G. Atkins

Mr. Webster, on page 9 of your prepared statement, you address the issue of access by the Foreign Affairs Committee to intelligence information relevant to the Committee's need to such access in order to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities. While your statement addresses the issue of the availability of intelligence information generically, you did not address the specific problem raised when intelligence agency activities directly relate to this Committee's legislative jurisdiction pursuant to the Rules of the House.

I will cite one current example of such an activity.

On Tuesday, June 14, 1986, the Committee Staff received a briefing, as requested, from your staff on the formation of a new entity within your agency called the Security Evaluation Office. The briefing also was attended by the Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, Robert Lamb.

According to your representatives at the briefing, your Agency is in the process of establishing the "Security Evaluation Office" whose purpose would be to audit overseas embassy security programs and activities and, when necessary, set new embassy security standards. The Committee Staff was told that your Agency intends to have the SEO in operation by October 1, 1986, and that you are in the process of recruiting a substantial number of personnel from other Government Departments, including the State Department, for this purpose. The recruitment and the implementation date seemed to be a surprise to the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security. The Staff was also told that you have informally requested a substantial amount of money to fund the SEO before the Intelligence and Appropriations Committees. These actions raise a number of questions:

As you know, the Committee initiated action of the so-called Inman recommendations on Embassy security at the formal request of the President less than three years ago. That legislation, which stipulated that the Secretary of State is responsible for embassy security, including the setting of standards, became the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1974 (Public Law 99-399).

The placement of the responsibility for auditing and setting embassy security standards in the SEO would appear to contravene existing law. Do you, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, plan to request an

amendment to existing law which would authorize the proposed activities of the SEO? On what basis have you proceeded thus far? Has the President issued an Executive Order to establish the SEO? Did the OMB approve a budget amendment to fund the SEO?

As you know the Committee has primary legislative and oversight jurisdiction over embassy security issues. At the very least, the Subcommittee on International Operations should hear formal testimony from you and the Secretary of State before proceeding with this very ad hoc proposal which appears to be in conflict with existing law.

I would appreciate your response to my questions and concerns. Thank you.

~~SECRET~~

23 June 1988

ANALYSIS OF 10 JUNE 1988  
MICA-SNOWE LETTER FOR THE  
SECRETARY OF STATE

First Page, Second Paragraph

"...this unit...would report results of compliance with security standards to the DCI and other,..."

Comment

Yes, the two primary recipients in the first instance are the DCI and the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State can receive these results directly but we envision that they will be provided first to the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security to ensure that the State management authorities and responsibilities are appropriately engaged.

~~SECRET~~

First Page, Second Paragraph

"...this unit...would have the authority to 'decertify' the ability of any U.S. diplomatic or consular mission to maintain classified information..."

Comment

We explain the process differently. The DCI Security Evaluation Office will evaluate the intelligence threat and the vulnerability of the embassies, set standards, monitor compliance, and assist the Department in improving security. The Security Evaluation Office and the DCI may recommend to the Secretary of State that he rescind the authority of a particular facility to receive or retain classified information or perform classified functions in the event of serious security problems. In this event, the DCI and the Secretary of State would discuss the problem, perhaps in consultation with a high-level board of advisors. If they seek the opinion of a high-level board, and either the DCI or the Secretary is not in agreement with the result, either can appeal to the President. This is by direction of the President. We should emphasize here that the Secretary of State must make the management decisions in this regard and it is he who must defend these decisions to the President and to the Congress.

S E C R E T

First Page, Second Paragraph

"...this unit would not operate under the authority of the Secretary of State..."

Comment

Secretary Shultz and the DCI proposed, in a 3 August 1987 letter to the President, "...The head of this unit would be named by and responsible to the DCI, who will report problems and recommendations to the Secretary of State for his action as the person responsible for the management of embassies and missions abroad..."

Colin Powell replied 22 October 1987 "...The President agrees with your recommendation to establish a unit responsible for setting standards to protect embassies from penetration by intelligence activity, and for monitoring conformity with those standards. The head of the unit will be named by and be responsible to the DCI, who will report problems and recommendations to the Secretary of State for his action..."

S E C R E T

First Page, Third Paragraph

"...current law, as strengthened by the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, holds the Secretary of State firmly responsible and accountable for ensuring all areas of technical and physical security at U.S. posts abroad..."

Comment

From the DCI perspective, we see no conflict between the Security Evaluation Office function and those responsibilities and intend none.

Second Page, Last Paragraph

"...The creation of a [sic] unit under consideration would run counter to the deliberate and clearly stated authorities given exclusively to the Secretary by the Omnibus Act, and would violate the spirit of the Act's goal of consolidating security functions under one responsible and accountable official."

Comment

From the DCI perspective, we believe that the Secretary of State is that one responsible and accountable official in the context of Section 106 of the Act as quoted in the preceding paragraph. "other Federal agencies...may... provide assistance to the Secretary..." The Secretary of State and the DCI proposed an assistance arrangement of that sort to the President and he so directed on 22 October 1987.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Third Page, Last Paragraph

The last paragraph contains four questions for the Secretary and we offer comments on three of them.

Comment

(1) Yes, the DCI Security Evaluation Office was established effective 4 April 1988. Secretary Shultz, Under Secretary Spiers, Assistant Secretary Lamb, and the State Management Council have been briefed. Also, the intelligence oversight and appropriations committees or staffs have been briefed as have the HFAC Staff.

(2) The DCI General Counsel and the DCI perceive no requirement for any legislative changes, believing the arrangement for the Security Evaluation Office fits within existing legislation.

(3) From the DCI perspective, from both a management and legal viewpoint, we do not believe the Secretary has ceded "control and responsibility over the security of diplomatic personnel and facilities to another agency..." certainly not to the DCI nor the DCI Security Evaluation Office.

S E C R E T



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JOHN J. BRADY, Jr.  
 Chief of Staff

One Hundredth Congress  
 Congress of the United States  
 Committee on Foreign Affairs

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

ER

88-2523X

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STEVEN S. BERRY  
 Minority Chief of Staff

June 10, 1988

The Honorable George P. Shultz  
 Secretary of State  
 Department of State  
 Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We are aware of discussions between the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency regarding ways to incorporate the intelligence community's expertise in areas of security pertaining to the technical threat of hostile intelligence entities. We support the goal of bridging institutional differences and prerogatives to forge a new cooperative atmosphere in this area, particularly in light of the revelations relating to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

We have previously chosen not to comment on the discussions between your department and the agency hoping that the experts would reach, on their own, appropriate arrangements. As things stand now, however, we believe that this effort has strayed. These discussions have centered on creating an entity to set security standards for overseas missions and monitor compliance with these standards. It has been proposed that this unit would be headed by an individual appointed by the Director for Central Intelligence (DCI), would be largely staffed by members of the intelligence community, would report results of compliance with security standards to the DCI and others, and would have the authority to "decertify" the ability of any U.S. diplomatic or consular mission to maintain classified information. As currently proposed, this unit would not operate under the authority of the Secretary of State. Furthermore, we understand that such fundamental decisions establishing security standards and decertifying diplomatic and consular posts would be made outside of the supervision and direction of the Secretary of State.

However, current law, as strengthened by the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, holds the Secretary of State firmly responsible and accountable for ensuring all areas of technical and physical security at U.S. posts abroad. In the discussions on establishing this new entity, we hope that you do not intend to abdicate your responsibilities, nor undermine the consensus between the Executive and

The Honorable George P. Shultz

June 10, 1988

Page Two

Legislative branches embodied in Titles I-IV of the Act. In Section 103 of the Act, Congress directed that the Secretary of State *shall* (emphasis added) be responsible, among other things, for:

security policies and programs, including funding levels and standards; protection of all U.S. Government personnel on official duty abroad...[and] establishment and operation of security functions at all U.S. Government missions abroad.

As authors of the Act, we intentionally consolidated the security structure within the Department of State and strengthened the responsibility and accountability of U.S. Ambassadors and the Secretary of State in maintaining both the technical and physical security of our embassies abroad. We think you would agree this is where the responsibility belongs. In approving the relevant provisions, Congress recognized the weaknesses of fragmented security functions, dispersed among too many agencies. Furthermore, the Act consolidated the entire function, formerly dispersed in various bureaus and offices in the Department of State, under a new Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security. This, also, served to strengthen the chain of command and accentuate the need for enhanced accountability.

We did not ignore the appropriate role of other agencies. The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act allows the Secretary of State to seek the assistance of other agencies in carrying out these responsibilities, and also directs other agencies to provide such assistance as may be requested. Section 106 of the Act states:

In order to facilitate fulfillment of the responsibilities described...other Federal agencies shall cooperate (through agreements) to the maximum extent possible with the Secretary of State. Such agencies may...provide assistance to the Secretary, perform security inspections, provide logistical support relating to the differing missions and facilities of other Federal agencies, and perform other overseas security functions as may be authorized by the Secretary. Specifically, the Secretary may agree to delegate operational control of overseas security functions of other Federal agencies to the heads of such agencies, subject to the Secretary's authority...The agency head receiving such delegated authority shall be responsible to the Secretary in the exercise of the delegated operational control.

Thus, while the Secretary of State may seek the expertise of other agencies in carrying out his responsibilities, all of the security operations of other agencies remain ultimately under the Secretary's control and responsibility. The creation of a unit under consideration would run counter to the deliberate and clearly stated authorities given exclusively to the Secretary by the Omnibus Act, and would violate the spirit of the Act's goal of consolidating security functions under one responsible and accountable official. Any


The Honorable George P. Shultz  
June 10, 1988  
Page Three

organizational changes altering the Secretary of State's authorities and responsibilities established under law would require further legislative action by this Committee and by Congress.

Given our deep concern with this proposal, we request responses to the following questions: (1) is the proposed unit already being established; (2) will the Administration seek the necessary legislative changes prior to establishment of such a unit; (3) why it is felt necessary to cede the Secretary's control and responsibility over the security of diplomatic personnel and facilities to another agency; and, (4) how do you intend to address the unavoidable impact the unit's decisions would have on the Department's budget?


We look forward to working with you on this important issue.

With warm regards,



Daniel A. Kluga  
Chairman  
Subcommittee on  
International Operations

Sincerely,



Olympia J. Snowe  
Ranking Minority Member  
Subcommittee on  
International Operations

ER 3385X-88

29 August 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director for Operations  
for Counterintelligence  
Director, Office of Congressional Affairs  
Director of Security  
Director, Community Counterintelligence  
and Security Countermeasures Staff

FROM:

[Redacted]

Director, Security Evaluation Office

25X1

SUBJECT:

Draft Testimony for the DDCI before the  
House Foreign Affairs Committee

1. I would like to solicit your comments on the attached revised draft testimony which was prepared for the DDCI to give before the House Foreign Affairs Committee (date still undetermined). Also attached are Q's and A's that were internally generated by SEO.

2. Your response would be appreciated by COB Tuesday, 6 September.

Attachments:  
As stated

[Redacted]

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This memo becomes UNCLASSIFIED upon  
removal of attachments.

[Redacted]



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*L-268-1R*

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The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Security Evaluation Office

*Ron - I want you to review this also.*  
25 August 1988  
*Fred*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert E. Lamb  
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of  
Diplomatic Security  
Department of State

FROM:

Director, Security Evaluation Office

SUBJECT: *Bob* Draft Testimony, HFAC, September 1988

1. The House Foreign Affairs Committee has been attempting to schedule a hearing for the Secretary of State and the DCI since early August. The Committee wishes to hear the views of both officials and to review progress in implementing the President's instruction for the DCI Security Evaluation Office. It now appears the Committee will hold the hearing in September even if the Deputy Secretary and the Deputy Director are the only ones available.

2. The attached draft testimony is offered for your comments and suggestions. Our Office of Congressional Affairs will provide copies to its State counterpart. Our approach is to describe the background and context for the DCI Security Evaluation Office as well as our concept for organization and activity. We do this by six pages of testimony plus other items submitted for the record. The attached package also contains Q's and A's developed here.

3. Please provide your comments and suggestions as soon as possible. We also would welcome the opportunity to see the Secretary/Deputy Secretary's testimony some time before the hearing.

Attachment:  
As stated

Distribution:

- Orig - Adse
- 1 - Ronald I. Spiers/DOS
- 1 - HFH Chron
- 1 - SEO Chron
- 1 - State File
- 1 - ER (w/o/att)

D/SEO/DCI

(25 Aug 88)  
~~SECRET~~



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THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

25 August 1988

Security Evaluation Office

NOTE FOR: Ruth Whiteside

FROM:

[Redacted]

25X1

Ruth,

I know that Bob will not return until mid-week and suggest therefore that you provide copies to Clark Dittmer, Greg Bujac, and others to assemble comments for Bob.

I also sent a copy to Ron Spiers.

[Redacted]

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Attachment:  
Draft Testimony

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19 August 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence


FROM: Director, Security Evaluation Office

SUBJECT: Suggested Draft Testimony before the House  
Foreign Affairs Committee on the Security  
Evaluation Office

1. The House Foreign Affairs Committee staff has advised us that their Members plan to hold a hearing on the Security Evaluation Office. They are currently attempting to find a date in the September timeframe in which both the DCI and Secretary Shultz could appear. It is also quite possible that you and John Whitehead would have to make the presentation.

2. I have drafted the attached opening statement. The Q's and A's are also internally generated. If you and the DCI have no objection,  25X1  
of OCA and I will start coordinating this draft package with the appropriate offices at State.

Attachment:  
As stated



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~~SECRET~~QUESTION:

Is the State Department cooperating with your Security Evaluation Office?

ANSWER:

The dialogue with the Secretary, the Under Secretary for Management, and the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security has been good. On the other hand, the Diplomatic Security Service has not cooperated in the review of current security standards, has not shared any information about its inspection program, and has ordered the two Foreign Service Officer volunteers to the office not to take the polygraph examination. We had anticipated that some members of the Diplomatic Security Service would not be overjoyed at the prospect of an independent audit of State's security standards and compliance. Professional pride surfaces at times like this. On the other hand, I believe the intelligence threat is such that the Diplomatic Security Service needs all the help it can get. Further, the President has asked for an independent, objective look at these standards and compliance issues for himself, the Secretary and the Congress. Over time, strong and enlightened management will prevail in the Department and cooperation will improve.

*See much better than  
question with 1st sentence  
See how have been to at  
his own stage with  
various stages  
implementation  
but not better  
worked in  
you & Secretary  
for & Secretary  
new concept &  
problem, board  
to be seen with  
with interview  
new being worked  
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on through  
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dialogue*

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Security Evaluation Office

23 June 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Director, Security Evaluation Office

SUBJECT: HFAC Concern with DCI Security Evaluation Office

1. This is a request that you sign two memoranda in response to HFAC concerns raised about the Security Evaluation Office. One memorandum is from you to the Secretary of State offering your comments on a Mica and Snowe letter to him. The DCI perspectives should be available to Secretary Shultz as he contemplates his response. The second memorandum is a reply to Representative Atkins of HFAC who posed a question to the DCI at the 15 June hearing. Representative Atkins' letter reflects some of the same issues.

2. The background of the HFAC questions appears to be a convergence of two factors, one is the jurisdictional struggle between the HPSCI and the HFAC, the other is State resistance to the independent audit function of the Security Evaluation Office manifesting itself in a lobbying campaign at HFAC. The net result is that HFAC is raising the question of the formation of the DCI Security Evaluation Office being in conflict with the 1986 Omnibus Security Act.

3. The OGC has reviewed the legislative authority issues and finds that the DCI Security Evaluation Office functions and procedures are compatible with the 1986 Omnibus Security Act and no remedial legislation appears to be necessary.

4. These memoranda reflect your emendations and our discussion yesterday with Ron Spiers and Bob Lamb.

5. My recommendation is that you sign the memorandum to Secretary Shultz commenting on the Mica and Snowe memorandum to him and enclose a copy of your reply to Representative Atkins, also recommended for signature.



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~~SECRET~~

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Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

The Honorable George P. Shultz  
The Secretary of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I offer you my comments on the 10 June 1988 letter sent to you by Representatives Mica and Snowe of the HFAC Subcommittee on International Operations. A copy of it was provided to me by the Committee.

That letter is dated 10 June and was written before the 13 June briefing and discussion of the DCI Security Evaluation Office conducted by [redacted] and Bob Lamb with the HFAC Staff. The HFAC Staff, I understand, reflected serious misunderstanding at the 13 June discussion of what you and Judge Webster are trying to do with the Security Evaluation Office. The misunderstandings are also reflected in this 10 June Mica and Snowe letter.

The comments on specific points in the Mica and Snowe letter reflect Bill Webster's views, ones I believe you share, and you are welcome to use them in your response to their letter. Also, I have enclosed our response to the question from Representative Atkins reflecting many of the same issues raised by Representatives Mica and Snowe.

Regards,

Robert M. Gates  
Acting Director

Enclosures: a/s

cc: Under Secretary Armacost  
Under Secretary Spiers  
Assistant Secretary Lamb

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Letter to The Honorable George P. Shultz

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